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Abstract. Artificial neural network (ANN) provides superior accuracy
for nonlinear alternating current (AC) state estimation (SE) in smart
grid over traditional methods. However, research has discovered that
ANN could be easily fooled by adversarial examples. In this paper, we ini-
tiate a new study of adversarial false data injection (FDI) attack against
AC SE with ANN: by injecting a deliberate attack vector into measure-
ments, the attacker can degrade the accuracy of ANN SE while remaining
undetected. We propose a population-based algorithm and a gradient-
based algorithm to generate attack vectors. The performance of these
algorithms are evaluated through simulations on IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus and
30-bus systems under various attack scenarios. Simulation results show
that DE is more effective than SLSQP on all simulation cases. The attack
examples generated by DE algorithm successfully degrade the ANN SE
accuracy with high probability.
Keywords: smart grid · AC state estimation· false data injection attack
· adversarial learning
1 Introduction
With the increase of residential and industrial power demand, nowadays a re-
gional or nationwide power outage often leads to catastrophes in the matter of
public safety. After the Northeast Blackout of the US in 2003, the US and Canada
have reached a consensus in transferring into smart grid system, which is cleaner,
more efficient, reliable, resilient and responsive than traditional grid. While the
transition provides many attractive new features such as remote and automatic
grid monitoring, control, and pricing, it also raised serious security challenges
by opening up traditional power system to many potential attacks in the cyber
space. In the 2015 Ukraine power outage ([12], [4]), the hacker successfully com-
promised the information systems of three energy distribution companies and
caused power disruption to over 225,000 customers. Since then, cyber attacks in
smart grid have become a realistic and growing concern. Therefore, it is signif-
icant and urgent to identify possible threats, and propose countermeasures to
eliminate such threats, so as to reduce the potential loss of the society.
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State estimation (SE) plays an important role in system monitoring and con-
trol, as it provides current system status for control center operators to take ac-
tions in advance to avoid potential accidents. In alternating current (AC) power
flow systems, states and measurements are non-linearly related, several efforts
have been made to adopt artificial neural networks (ANNs) for AC SE to better
model this non-linear relationship ([1], [15], [16], [11]). Although the training
phase of these ANN models is costly, it has been shown that these ANN SE
models are more accurate. However, studies have shown that SE is vulnerable
to false data injection (FDI) attacks [13]. The adversary can corrupt state vari-
ables by injecting a well-coordinated false data to meter measurements, while
evading detection. FDI attacks on direct current (DC) power flow model can
be linearly formulated, hence it is easy to understand their impact and propose
countermeasures against them. Nonetheless, FDI attacks towards AC SE are
more complicated. The non-linearity between state variables and measurements
diffuses the strength of false injection, and makes it hard to identify how the
change of measurements would result in the errors to state variables. There are
few studies tackling the FDI attacks to AC SE. Jia et al. [9] claims that the abil-
ity of malicious attack designed for DC power flow model is alleviated on AC
power flow model. Several FDI attacks against AC SE are derived from DC FDI
attack and predominantly based upon weighted least square (WLS) ([7], [17]).
In the area of image classification, Szegedy first noticed that neural networks
may be easily fooled by well-coordinated samples with small perturbations [20].
Since then, there have been many efforts in exploring the robustness of ANN by
designing adversarial attacks ([6], [19]).
In this paper, we are interested in examining whether the above vulnerability
of ANN presented in image classification problem can be extended to SE problem
in smart grid. Furthermore, we attempt to develop algorithms that can system-
atically generate polluted measurements that maximize ANN SE error while
eluding from being detected by the bad data detector. By answering these ques-
tions, we intend to establish new understanding on the security vulnerabilities
of the latest high-accuracy ANN AC SE models. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first in the literature that studies FDI to ANN AC SE models.
Solving our problem faces new and significant challenges. First, our problem
has an optimization nature in the sense that we seek the optimal attack vector
that maximizes the attack outcomes, while the goal of the image-classification
counterparts is just to find a feasible attack vector. Second, the attack model in
our problem considers the attacker’s access and resource constraints, by which
the attacker only has access to and can only manipulate a certain numbers of
meters. In contrast, the image-classification problem has no such constraint and
the attacker is allowed to change any pixel of the image. Lastly, the output of
ANN SE model is a continuous value, whereas that of the image-classification is
discrete and covers a limited number of pre-defined cases. Due to these funda-
mental structural differences, the existing results from image-classification ANN
are not directly applicable to our problem. The main contributions of our work
include the following four-fold:
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– In creating the target ANN SE models for large-scale grid systems, a novel
penalty term is proposed for the loss function, which significantly improves
the accuracy of the ANN on modeling voltage phase angle.
– An optimization-based FDI attack formulation is proposed for AC SE un-
der the nonlinear ANN model, which can accommodate various practical
constraints on the attacker, including its resource and meter accessibility.
– We adapt DE and SLSQP to solve the above optimization, targeting at two
different attack scenarios: DE generates attack vectors for which the attacker
can compromise any k meters, while DE and SLSQP target on the scenario
where the attacker is restricted to compromise specific k meters.
– The effectiveness of the proposed attack models is verified based on extensive
simulations on three test systems under various attack scenarios. Our results
show that the DE attack succeeds for more than 80% cases even with a small
number of compromised meters and low false injection level.
This paper is structured as the following. We start by providing preliminary
for SE and bad data detection in Section 2. We construct AC SE models with
ANN as targets for our attacks in Section 3. Subsequently, we introduce our
adversary model in Section 4. Our two attack algorithms, DE algorithm and
SLSQP algorithm would be presented in Section 5. Finally, the experimental
analysis and the comparison of our two attacks on target models and conclusions
are presented in Section 6 and Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In AC power flow model, measurements of power flows are non-linearly depen-
dent on state variables, as characterized by the following equations: z = h(x)+e,
where z and x denote a Nm-dimension measurement vector and a Nn-dimension
state vector, respectively, e denotes a Nm-dimension vector of normally dis-
tributed measurement errors, and h is a set of nonlinear functions relating states
to measurements. In an over-determined case (Nm > Nn), the state variables
are determined from WLS optimization over a residual function J(x) [21]:
xˆ = argmin
x
J(x),where J(x) = (z− h(x))TW(z− h(x)) (1)
Here, the weight matrix W is defined as diag{σ−21 , σ
−2
2 , ..., σ
−2
Nm
}, and σ2i is
the variance of the ith measurement (i = 1, ..., Nm).
Bad measurements would be introduced due to various reasons, such as mea-
suring noise, transmission error, meter malfunction and malicious attack. The
ability to detect and identify bad data is extremely critical to the stability of a
smart grid. Most bad data detection schemes rely on the residuals J(xˆ) as their
decision variable. In particular, given the assumption that e is normally dis-
tributed, it is shown that J(x) follows χ2(K) distribution, where K = Nm−Nn
is the degree of freedom [21]. Any residual exceeding some pre-determined thresh-
old τ is recognized as a bad data:
z is identified as a bad data, if J(xˆ) = (z− h(xˆ))TW(z− h(xˆ)) > τ. (2)
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The threshold τ can be determined by a significant level α in hypothesis
testing, by which the false alarms would occur with probability α.
3 ANN-based AC SE
In lack of actual state-measurement data from real power grid, the training and
testing cases in our study are generated based on simulations over the IEEE
test systems (9-bus, 14-bus, 30-bus). A Matlab package, MATPOWER [22], is
used for data generation and power flow analysis. Note that the use of simulated
data in training does not affect the validity of the proposed ANN model. Usu-
ally the model is trained off-line, and then to be retrain or improved with the
accumulation of actual data following the same procedure.
State variables, including magnitudes and phase angles of bus voltages may
change within a small range under different loads. To account for this dynamic
behavior, we consider a series of loads of the power grid ranging from 80% to
120% to simulate actual load pattern. For each instance of the load, the states
are calculated by power flow analysis using MATPOWER. According to [2], ±2%
error is allowed in a power measurement reading. In line with this specification,
we add an independent Gaussian noise ǫ to each measurement reading ψ, so that
the simulated measurement reading becomes (1 + ǫ)ψ, where ǫ ∼ N(0, 0.67%2).
For each of systems, 10,000 and 1,000 state-measurement pairs are generated for
training and testing, respectively.
Three ANN SE models are trained for the three systems, respectively. Follow-
ing [8] [1] [14] and [15], each ANN SE model possesses a multi-layered perceptron
architecture. We use mean WLS error as loss function:
loss(z,x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(z− h(x))TW(z− h(x)) (3)
where N is number of training samples. Our experiments show this loss func-
tion works well for small-scale systems (such as 9-bus and 14-bus power grid),
but fails to provide accurate estimation for voltage phase angles in larger scale
systems (30-bus power grid). This is consistent with previous findings in [14]. To
address this issue, we revise the loss function in Eq.(3) by adding a new penalty
term of the mean square error (MSE) between the actual and the estimated
states, leading to the new loss function in Eq.(4) specially designed for large-
scale systems. In this new loss function, a small constant c is added to balance
both error terms so that the gradient descent works on both terms simultane-
ously. Our experiments show that by adding this new penalty term, the voltage
phase angle estimation error is reduced from 12% to 1.3% in 30-bus system.
loss(z,x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(z− h(x))TW(z− h(x)) + c
1
N
N∑
i=1
(x− xˆ)2 (4)
After the ANN models are trained, the testing data is used to evaluate their
performance. A good SE model should preserve two properties: (1) provide ac-
curate SE irrespective of the noise in the measurements; (2) bad-data alarms not
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triggered by regular measurement noise. Accordingly, we evaluate the estimation
accuracy of the ANNs by maximum absolute relative error (MARE) between the
true and the estimated values. An estimation is considered accurate if MAREs
of the voltage magnitude and the voltage phase angle do not exceed 1% and 5%,
respectively. Table1 summarizes the performance evaluation results based on a
significant level α = 0.01 for the trained ANN models. It is clear from these
tables that the proposed ANN models are able to estimate AC states accurately,
and have low false alarm rate for bad data under regular measurement noises.
Table 1: ANN SE Model Evaluation
Test System MARE(|V |) Accuracy(|V |)(%) MARE(θ) Accuracy(θ)(%) Bad Data(%)
9-bus 2.4 × 10−5 100 1.6× 10−2 96 0
14-bus 5.6 × 10−5 100 1.6× 10−2 99 3
30-bus 6.5 × 10−5 100 1.3× 10−2 98 5
4 Adversarial Model and Attack Formulation
4.1 Adversarial Model
The goal of the attacker is to launch a FDI attack, in which the attacker aims
to decide and inject a manipulated measurement vector into the measurement
under given resource and meter accessibility constraints, such that the injection
can maximize SE error while remaining stealthy.
The attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of the topology and configu-
ration of the power grid, such as the nodal admittance matrix. Such information
could be accessed or estimated from public database or historical records. In
addition, the attacker is also assumed to know everything about the ANN SE
model, including the architecture and the parameters. These information could
be obtained by the attacker either through breaking into the information system
of the power grid (similar to the 2015 Ukraine case) or through training a shadow
ANN that mimics the real ANN SE model on a substitute data set. The attacker
is also assumed to know the threshold of the bad data detector. Although these
assumptions render a strong attacker that may not always represent the prac-
tical cases, it enables us to evaluate the robustness and vulnerabilities of the
ANN SE models under the worst-case scenario, providing an upper bound on
the impact of FDI attacks on ANN AC SE.
In addition to the bad data detection threshold, the adversary is also facing
other constraints, including the set of meters she has access to, the maximum
number of meters she can compromise, and the maximum amount of errors she
can inject into a true measurement to avoid being detected.
Note that in this paper we only consider the FDI attacks that happen during
the operational phase of the ANN SE. In other words, the adversary is only
able to tamper the measurement inputs after the ANN model is trained. It
is not allowed to perturb either the training data or the trained model. The
investigation of training data and model pollution is out of the scope of this
paper and will be studied in our future work.
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4.2 Attack Formulation
Let za be the measurement vector in the presence of FDI attack, then za can be
described as:
za = z+ a = h(x) + a, (5)
where a is a Nm-dimension non-zero attack vector. Given the input of manipu-
lated measurement za, the output by the ANN SE f is as follows:
xˆa = f(za) = f(z+ a) (6)
According to Eq.(2), an adversary intending to elude from bad data detection
must satisfy the following condition:
J(xˆa) = (za − h(xˆa))
TW(za − h(xˆa)) ≤ τ (7)
The error injected to SE hence can be calculated by:
xˆa − xˆ = f(za)− f(z). (8)
With the above notations, the problem of finding the best adversarial injec-
tion a for a given measurement z can be formulated as a constrained optimiza-
tion:
maximize
a
‖xˆa − xˆ‖p
subject to (z− h(xˆa))
TW(za − h(xˆa)) < τ,
‖a‖0 ≤ L,
ali ≤ ai ≤ a
u
i , i = 1, ..., Nm,
zmini ≤ zai ≤ z
max
i , i = 1, ..., Nm,
(9)
where L is the maximum number of meters the attacker can compromise, [ali, a
u
i ]
provides limits of modification to each compromised meter, and [zmini , z
max
i ]
denotes the valid range for each measurement, ensuring the manipulated mea-
surement to still be within the power range permitted on that particular unit.
The strength of measurement modification depends on the attacker’s resource
and meter accessibility constraints, which have not been considered in previous
work. In our work, by limiting the measurement manipulation to a subset of
meters, we are able to prevent from injecting excessive errors, which can be eas-
ily detected by univariate analysis. In addition, if the adversary can locate high
precision meters, she can avoid injecting too much errors into those meters and
instead allocate resource to other meters to improve the overall attack outcomes.
The objective function in the optimization Eq.(9) requires a distance metric
‖ ·‖p to quantify attack impact. This distance metric should be carefully defined
to reflect the severity of physical impact on the power grid caused by the SE
error. In reality, the voltage magnitudes in the state are always limited in a tight
range to ensure stable electricity supply, while the voltage phase angles could
vary in a relatively large range, and hence an erroneous estimation of the latter
may seriously affect the consistent operation of the power grid, but cannot be
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easily detected. Therefore, we define the adversary’s objective function as the
maximum change to the voltage phase angles θ:
‖xˆa − xˆ‖∞ = max(|θˆa1 − θˆ1|, ..., |θˆan − θˆn|) (10)
5 Attack Methodology
5.1 Solving the Proposed Attack with DE
As a population based stochastic optimization algorithm, DE algorithm was first
proposed in 1996 by Rainer et al. [18]. The population is randomly initialized
within the variable bounds. In each generation, a mutant vector is produced by
adding a target vector (father) with a weighted difference of other two randomly
chosen variables. Then a crossover parameter mixes father and mutant vector
to form a candidate solution (child). A comparison is drawn between father and
child, whichever that is better will enter the next generation.
We follow [19] to encode our measurement attack vector into an array, which
contains a fixed number of perturbations, and each perturbation holds two val-
ues: the compromised meter index and the amount to inject to that meter. The
use of DE and the encoding has the following three advantages: 1. Higher
probability of finding global optimum - In each generation, the diversity
introduced by mutation and crossover operations ensures the solution not stuck
in local optimum, and thus leads to a higher probability of finding global op-
timum. 2. Adaptability for multiple attacks - DE can adapt to different
attack scenarios based on our encoding method. By DE can search for both
meter indices and injection amount or only search for injection amount to these
specified meters, by specifying the number of meters to compromise or fixing the
meter indices. 3. Parallelizibility to shorten attack time - As the smart grid
scale increases, generating one attack vector may take from seconds to minutes.
An attacker must finish attack vector generation and injection before next SE
takes place. As it is based on a vector population, DE is parallelization friendly,
so as to significantly expedite the computation for the attack vector.
Next, we present how we adapt DE algorithm to our proposed attack. The
pseudo code for the proposed attack using DE is presented in Algorithm 1:
– Deal with duplicate meter indices - Instead of outputting the exact
meter value, we select to output the injection vector to narrow down search
space. We use two approaches to ensure the uniqueness of meter indices
in the solution. First, we generate meter indices without replacement in
population initialization. Second, we add a filter in the crossover operation.
This filter keeps the meter indices unchanged if the newly selected meter
index is repetitive with previous meter indices.
– Ensure the measurement after injection is within range - A valid
measurement reading must satisfy zmini ≤ zi + ai ≤ z
max
i for all i, where
zmini and z
max
i are lower and upper limit power permitted on zi. We use an in-
tuitive approach by replace za = z+a with za = min(max(za, z
min), zmax),
where the min and max are element-wise operations.
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– Deal with the overall constraint - In addressing constraints with DE, us-
ing a penalty function has been the most popular approach. However, they
do not always yield satisfactory solutions since the appropriate multiplier
for the penalty term is difficult to choose and the objective function may
be distorted by the penalty term. Therefore, we use a heuristic constraint
handling method [5]. A pair-wise comparison is performed between fathers
and children in order to differentiate better solutions from population. The
three criteria of the pair-wise comparison are as the following: 1. If both
vectors are feasible, the one with the best objective function value is pre-
ferred. 2. If one vector is feasible and the other one is not, the feasible one
is preferred. 3. If both two vectors are infeasible, the one with the smaller
constraint violation is preferred. The above comparisons handle constraint
in two steps: first, the comparison among feasible and infeasible solutions
provides a search direction towards the feasible region; then, the crossover
and mutation operations keep the search near the global optimum, while
maintaining the diversity among feasible solutions.
Algorithm 1 DE attack
Input: measurement z, GENMAX{maximum number of generations}, N{population
size}, f{objective function}, g{constraint function}, CR{crossover rate}
Output: injection vector a
1: g = 0
2: Population initialization ai,0 for i = 1, ..., N . Meter indices are randomly select
without replacement and injection amounts are randomly select within the uni-
variate bound.
3: Evaluate the f(ai,g) and constraint violation CV (ai,g) = max(g(ai,g), 0), for i =
1, ..., N
4: for g = 1 : MAXGEN do
5: for i = 1 : N do
6: Randomly select r1 and r2
7: jrand = randint(1, Nm)
8: for j = 1 : D do
9: if (randj [0, 1) < CR or j = jrand) and the meter index not repetitive with
previous meter indices then
10: uji,g+1 = x
j
best,G + F (x
j
r1,g
− xjr2,g)
11: else
12: uji,g+1 = x
j
i,G
13: end if
14: end for
15: Evaluate f(ui,g+1) and CV (ui,g+1)
16: Update the population if the child ui,g+1 is better than the father xi,g by the
above three criteria
17: end for
18: end for
5.2 Solving the Proposed Attack with SLSQP
In some gradient based attack algorithms in image classification([20], [3]), the
logistic function is added to the objective function as a penalty term and the
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parameter for the penalty term is chosen by line search. These algorithms aim
to find a feasible feasible solution, not the optimal one. Therefore, we use a
conventional optimization algorithm (SLSQP) [10]. SLSQP is a variation on the
SQP algorithm for non-linearly constrained gradient-based optimization. In our
SLSQP attack, we encode the solution to a Nm-dimension vector, in which the
ith element denotes the injection amount to the ith meter. This encoding allows
the attacker to generate attack vectors with a set of specified meters by placing
upper and lower bounds to corresponding elements in the attack vector. To solve
the proposed optimization problem, we first construct the Lagrangian function:
L(a, λ) = f(a) + λ · g(a), (11)
where {f(a) = ‖xˆa − xˆ‖∞
g(a) = (z − h(xˆa))
TW(za − h(xˆa)) < τ
(12)
In each iteration k, the above problem can be solved by transferring to a linear
least square sub-problem in the following form:
max
d
‖(Dk)
1/2
(Lk)Td+ ((Dk)−1/2(Lk)−1∇(ak)‖
subject to ∇g(ak)d+ g(ak) ≥ 0
(13)
where LkDk(Lk)T is a stable factorization of the chosen search direction∇2zzL(z, λ)
and is updated by BFGS method. By solving the QP sub-problem for each iter-
ation, we can get the value of dk, i.e., the update direction for zk:
zk+1 = zk + αdk (14)
where α is the step size, which is determined by solving an additional opti-
mization. The step size ψ(α) := φ(ak + αdk) with xk and dk are fixed, can be
obtained by a minimization:
φ(ak; r) := f(ak) +max(r · g(a), 0) (15)
with r being updated by:
rk+1 := max(
1
2
(rk + |λ|, |λ|)) (16)
6 Attack Evaluation
Here, both FDI attacks are evaluated on IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus, and 30-bus test
systems. The simulateion is done in Python, using package TensorFlow and
SciPy, on a computer with a 3.5 GHz CPU and a 16 GB memory.
Depending on the attacker’s capability and practical constraints, the attacker
can launch attack under different scenarios. Inspired by [13], we construct two
attack scenarios to facilitate the evaluation: (1)Any k meter attacks. The
attacker can access all meters, but the number of meters to compromise is limited
by k. In this scenario, the attacker can wisely allocate the limited resources, by
selecting meters and injection amounts that will maximize her attack impact.
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(2)Specific k meter attacks. The attacker has the access to k specific meters.
For example, the attacker may only access the a set of meters in a small region.
She needs to determine injection amount to maximize attack impact.
We perform the experiment as follows. To fairly compare attack performance
on different test systems, we choose the percentage of meters being compromised,
R, to be 5%, 10% and 20%. For each R, we explore the attack performance under
different error injection levels: 2%, 5% and 10%. Each experiment runs on 1000
measurement instances, and is repeated for 10 times to reduce randomness.
We consider four metrics throughout evaluating the effectiveness of the at-
tacks. We measure the MAE and MARE of the error injected to voltage phase
angles. We also report the success probability, where success is defined as the
attack produce more than 1% or 5% MARE to voltage magnitude or phase an-
gle, respectively. Moreover, since the smart grid is assumed to be a quasi-static
system and the states change slowly over time, we want to investigate if the time
allows an adversary to mount an FDI attack to smart grid.
6.1 Any k Meter Attack
Under this scenario, the attacker can access all meters and has freedom to choose
any k meters to compromise. The way we encode the attack vector in DE enables
the search for better meters in every generation. In contrast, SLSQP only allows
us to put constraint on specific meter indices. Therefore, only DE can be used
to find attack vectors in any k meter attack.
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Fig. 1: An Example of a 5-meter Attack to 14-bus System
Our DE attack inject error to one of voltage phase angles while other values
keep unchanged. In Figure 1 (b) and (c), for injection level 10% and 20%, the
maximum injections are concentrated around 5% and seldom go beyond 10%,
due to the overall constraint of bad data detection.
In general, the success probability and attack impact increase as the attacker
controls more resource. The attack would succeed with larger probability (80%
of simulation instances) by compromising 10% of meters with injection level
10%. Especially for 14-bus system, the attack achieves 100% success for any
combination of R and injection level (Figure 2).
Interestingly, for 30-bus system, the impact of compromising 10% of meters
surpasses that of compromising 20% of meters. Moreover, the performance of
20% of meter compromised drops drastically as the injection level increases. A
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Fig. 2: Relative Error (first row) and Success Prob. (second row) of Any k Meter Attack
with N = 400 and GMAX = 400
possible explanation for this might be that, as the expansion of search dimension
and space, it would require more attempts to find a satisfactory solution.
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Fig. 3: Cumulative Frequency of Meters Presenting in Attack Vectors
Figure 3 shows the first seven cumulative meter indices’ frequency in the
attack vectors. Injection to meters with higher frequency can introduce larger
errors to state variables. Our DE attacks provide a practical way for system-
atically identifying key meters whose readings have a higher weight on the AC
SE, and thus may guide the utility company to reach a more focused protection
towards these key meters under resource and budget constraints.
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Table 2: Average NFEs and Execution Time (in second) of Any k Attacks
Test System NFEs Time (s)
9-bus 500-1500 0.25-0.45
14-bus 500-3500 0.5-1.73
30-bus 800-5600 1.5-2.7
6.2 Specific k Meter Attack
To explore the effect of population size and iteration number, we evaluate the
average number of function evaluations (NFEs) before delivering a successful
attack or there is no significant change in the solution. The NFEs and corre-
sponding running time are shown in Table 2.
In this constrained scenario, the attacker is able to compromise specific k
meters due to physical location restrictions. DE and SLSQP are implemented and
compared under this attack scenario. To search the injection amounts to specific
k meters, DE specifies the indices of the k meters in population initialization
and disables the mutation operation, while SLSQP only allows modifications to
the k meters in the attack vector. We randomly select R to be 5%, 10% and 20%
from test systems and perform the same set of experiments using both DE and
gradient-based algorithm and compare their performance by the same metrics.
In general, DE algorithm outperforms the gradient-based algorithm in effec-
tiveness (Figure 4). This is not surprising, as DE brings in more diversity in
every generation while SLSQP only explores neighbors in each iteration.
Table 3 shows the execution time of DE attack with 1×104 NFEs and SLSQP
attack with 100 iterations. Both attacks can be finished quickly within 3 seconds,
which is feasible for an attacker to mount on smart grid. The comparison of
running time between them can be misleading, since the execution time highly
relies on NFEs for DE and max iteration numbers for SLSQP. In addition, the
execution time can be further shortened by implementing a early-stop criteria or
parallel processing for DE, or adjusting the max iteration numbers for SLSQP.
Therefore, taking no account for running time, our experiments exhibit clear
pattern that DE attack is more effective than SLSQP attack.
Table 3: Execution Time (in second) Comparison of Specific k Attacks
Test System DE (s) SLSQP (s)
9-bus 0.12-0.4 0.036-0.6
14-bus 0.06-0.6 0.14-1.0
30-bus 0.3-3.0 0.26-2.2
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we perform the first study of adversarial FDI attacks against
ANN-based AC SE. We first create target models that are sufficiently strong.
Then we formulate the adversarial FDI attack into an optimization problem. We
extensively evaluate the proposed attacks under two attack scenarios on three
test systems, with adapted DE and SLSQP aiming to find attack vectors. In
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Fig. 4: Relative Error (first row) and Success Prob. (second row) of Specific k Meter
Attack
the any k meter attack, our results show that the DE attack is successful with
high probability even with a small number of compromised meters and low false
injection level. DE outperforms SLSQP in the specific k meter attack.
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